

Development of Japan-China Relations since 1972

Kazuyuki *Katayama**
Japanese Embassy in Belgium

Abstract

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, Japan-China relations experienced three periods: a “*heiwa yuko*” (peace and friendship) era; a “*seirei keinetsu*” (politically cold, economically hot) era; and an era of “*senryaku teki gokei kankei*” (mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests). Japan and China are perpetual neighbours, neither of which can simply relocate, and cannot but seek a win-win situation. For that purpose, this article argues the importance to manage bilateral relations based on the following principles: first, their relations should be guided by common interests, not driven by emotions; second, sensitive issues such as past history, Taiwan or the East China Sea disputes may sometimes shake their relations, which requires them to pursue a new thinking; third, a wide range of frank and candid communication networks between the governments, business sectors, academia and individuals is necessary; fourth, Japan-China relations are not only confined to bilateral purposes, but should also contribute to a new framework for Asia and the world; and fifth, both governments need to address to public diplomacy, a core target of which is the young generation. Japan’s relationship with the US and China determined Japan’s destiny in early 20th century and it still remains valid now. Japan’s diplomatic option is not “US or China,” but “US and China.” The US remains the most important partner for Japan, while Japan should and can cooperate with China on a bilateral, regional and global basis.

Keywords: *Japan-China strategic relationship, the US factor, diplomacy*

JEL classification: *F51, F52, F59, N45*

1. Introduction

This article reviews the development of Japan-China relations since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, and suggests a desirable future relationship.

At the beginning, the article briefly reviews international as well as domestic factors that encouraged both nations to realize the normalization, and how they enjoyed a period of “peace and friendship” until the late 1980s. Then the article examines how the June 4 Tiananmen Incident and the collapse of Berlin Wall changed strategic circumstances surrounding both nations in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The Japanese perception towards China also changed negatively as Japan declined and China reemerged during that period. Political disputes also influenced bilateral relations. Prime Minister Koizumi’s regular annual worship to the Yasukuni Shrine during his premiership created a decisive factor in worsening bilateral political relations. The article studies how those factors led to a vicious cycle in the trans-century period though economic interdependence was further deepened, which was called a period of “politically cold, economically hot.”

After Koizumi stepped down, Abe initiated a new China policy. The successive cabinets, including the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led government since 2009, have basically followed this guiding principle. The article analyzes the new stage of a win-win bilateral relationship, characterized by a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” and proposes that this strategic relationship should become a basis for future bilateral relations. In promoting a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, the article advises that both Japan and China need to treat politically sensitive issues in a clever and restraint manner. They include the past history, the Taiwan issue, and also the East China Sea, especially the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands issue.

The US and China are two most important countries for Japan. Japan’s relations with those two states determined Japan’s destiny in early 20th century. Japan’s mishandling of China caused serious conflict with the US and resulted in the Pacific War, which finally brought about a catastrophic failure for Japan. The article finally suggests the best option for Japan in its relations with China, taking into consideration the relations with the US, which remains the most important partner for Japan.

2. Normalization in 1972

The year 1971 is remembered by Japanese as the year of two “Nixon Shocks”. One was economic and another was political shock. On August 15, 1971, President Nixon declared unilaterally that the US government would impose a 10 per cent import surcharge and stop the convertibility of the US dollar to gold, thus putting an end to the Bretton Woods system. Another Nixon shock was directly related to China. Dr Kissinger, Assistant to Nixon for national security affairs secretly visited Beijing via Pakistan from July 9 to 11, 1971.¹ After his preparatory work with the Chinese side, both the US and Chinese

governments announced on July 15 (US time) that Nixon would make a visit to China at an appropriate time before May 1972 at the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai for the discussion of the normalization of the bilateral relationship and exchanging views on issues of mutual concern.² His visit to China as the first for a US President was carried out on February 21-28, 1972. The notification of Nixon's China visit to the Japanese government came out almost at the same time as the public announcement was remembered as a bitter lesson for Japanese diplomacy not only from the viewpoint of serious strategic shift coming from President Nixon's visit to China, but also from a psychological shock that Japan was ignored or at least nonchalantly treated by the US. It may not be realistic, however, to anticipate that the US would consult this kind of critical strategic shift of its foreign policy with Japan closely in advance as even the State Department was not informed in detail, either, and became a "victim" of Dr Kissinger's secret China diplomacy.³ Fearful of leaks, Dr Kissinger did not involve the US State Department in the negotiation process of Shanghai Communiqué, and as a result the State Department was not allowed to read its draft until twenty-four hours before it was to be released.⁴

There had been movements towards normalization between Japan and China since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. However, those movements could not make the Japanese government move to the direction of normalization because of international as well as, to a less degree, domestic reasons. Nixon's China visit, however, changed the situation. Kakuei Tanaka won the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), by defeating his opponent Takeo Fukuda and was accordingly appointed prime minister in July 1972. Tanaka held a press conference on July 5, stating that the basic issue of Japan-China relationship was to normalize relations through governmental consultations and that the time had come.⁵ Tanaka, accompanied by Foreign Minister Ohira and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido, visited China at the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai on September 25-30, 1972. Both governments finally reached agreement on the normalization of official relations by issuing a Joint Communiqué on September 29.

There had been several main issues to be resolved between both governments before the normalization. With regard to the historic issue, the Japanese side referred to the responsibility for the serious damage that it caused in the past to the Chinese people and deeply reproached itself.⁶ Regarding the representation of China, the Japanese government accepted the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China.⁷

The status of Taiwan was another sensitive issue. The Chinese government reiterated its position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC.⁸ Japan maintained its basic position that it was not in a position to

judge the legal status of Taiwan any more since the former renounced all rights, titles and claims over the latter as a result of having accepted the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which came into effect in 1952. In consistent with the principle, the Japanese government stated that it fully understands and respects the stand of the Chinese government and firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.⁹ Regarding the Peace Treaty between Japan and Republic of China entering into force on August 5, 1952, which the government of the PRC had claimed invalid, there was no reference in the Joint Communiqué of 1972. However, as having agreed with the Chinese side in advance, Ohira stated in the press conference in Beijing after signing the Joint Communiqué that as a result of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, it was the interpretation of the Japanese government that the Peace Treaty between Japan and “Republic of China” had lost its standing implications and had expired.¹⁰

The Chinese government declared its renouncement of war reparation demand to Japan.¹¹ The legal position of the Japanese government on the issue was that it had been already resolved as a result of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the “Republic of China” in 1952,¹² which the government of the PRC could never accept. Though the Japanese government maintained its basic legal position on the issue, Ohira, at his press conference, referred to this issue that taking into consideration the great damage that the Chinese people had received through the unhappy Japan-China War, Japan should appreciate frankly and appropriately the Chinese renouncement of war reparations on Japan.¹³ Later the Japanese government did not seem to focus on the difference of interpretations between the two governments but just referred, when necessary, that issues regarding war reparation between Japan and China have not existed any longer since the issuance of the Joint Communiqué in 1972, when normalization of diplomatic relations was realized.

There were several factors which made the Japan-China official relationship come to fruition more than six years ahead of the US that finally normalized with China in 1979. First of all, Japan and China were confronted with the common neighbouring enemy, the Soviet Union. Second, Nixon’s China visit assured Japan that the US government would not object Japan’s diplomatic step for normalization with China. Third, atonement feelings among Japanese public towards the Chinese resulting from the war were very strong in general. The so-called “friendly people” in Japan had worked hard for peace and friendship exchanges between the people in both countries and had paved the way for normalization from a grassroots level for a long period of time before normalization. Most Japanese public, intellectuals, mass media as well as many politicians and the business community also supported and encouraged normalization with China. Fourth, Tanaka’s political leadership

also contributed to an earlier realization of normalization. Fifth, Taiwan was a colony of Japan for fifty years until the end of WWII and pro-Taiwan Japanese politicians were not few, but Japan's relationship with Taiwan, different from US case, was mainly economic, not military.

After Mao Zedong passed away and the "Gang of Four" was arrested in 1976, Deng Xiaoping, a reformist, finally revived and came to the real force again in 1978 after ups and downs. He navigated China towards a new direction by adopting an openness and reform policy at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978,¹⁴ which determined China's course afterwards.¹⁵ Though China's economic status in the world still remained small, strategic circumstances surrounding Japan and China did not alter fundamentally until the end of Cold War and the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed on August 12, 1978 and entered into force on October 23, 1978. China had criticized that the Soviet Union was seeking hegemony. Japan considered its relations with the Soviet Union and watered down the hegemony clause. That was the main reason it took six years for negotiations to be concluded. The subsequent shift in international relations reminds us of the famous words by British statesman in the mid-19th century, Lord Palmerston that we have no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies and our national interests are eternal and perpetual.¹⁶

Japan and China, in general, developed and promoted a stable bilateral relationship through the rest of the 1970s and 1980s though politically difficult and sensitive questions sometimes occurred, including the issues of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands,¹⁷ the history textbooks used at Japanese high schools,¹⁸ prime minister's worship at the Yasukuni Shrine,¹⁹ and the "Kokuryo Dormitory" case.²⁰ In fact, the leaders of both Japan and China wisely handled the questions so that both countries could maintain peace and friendly relations in the 1970s and the 1980s. Sentimental slogans such as "*nicchu yuko sese daidai*" (Japan-China friendship for generations) and "*ichii taisui*" (Japan and China are separated only by a very narrow sea) were prevalent among governments and people. It could be said that the period between the 1972 normalization and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the collapse of Berlin Wall was a "peace and friendship" period.

3. Vicious Cycles in Trans-Century Period

The world faced a dramatic shift of East-West relations in the late 1980s. Japan and China were not allowed to be outsiders in this historic global structural change. The year 1989 was an unforgettable year for both Japan and China. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, visited China in May to restore Sino-Soviet normal relations. It was the first time since 1959 that a top Soviet leader visited China.²¹ The end of Cold War and Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*

had brought about a new strategic circumstance in the regional as well as in the global politics.

The democracy movement broke out in Beijing and other cities around China.²² The movement, however, ended with crackdown by the government as an “anti-revolutionary rebellion” on 4 June 1989. Chinese leaders were convinced that China took a right choice in contrast with the Soviet case. The Soviet Union hastened political reform too quickly before realizing economic reform and finally collapsed, whereas China has taken its economic reform first and succeeded in making China progress and stable under the strong Communist Party leadership. Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was dismissed because he “supported the turbulence and made a mistake of splitting Party” and was replaced by Jiang Zemin, then party secretary of Shanghai municipal committee. However, the Party’s basic line of economic development through reform and openness policy was firmly maintained.²³

The Arch G7 Summit in Paris adopted Political Declaration on China on July 15, 1989 and condemned the violent repression in China in defiance of human rights, but at the same time, anticipated that the Chinese government would create conditions to avoid their isolation and provide for a return to cooperation based on the resumption of movement towards political and economic reform and openness.²⁴ Japan, as a neighbouring country with a close historic link that could receive a larger and more direct impact from China, echoed western nations in condemning the human rights situations in China. At the same time, however, it stressed on the importance to encourage China to continue to take a road of modernization through reform and an openness policy and to engage it in the international community. The isolation of China was the least desirable option for Japan. It was because of this principle that Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu visited China in August 1991 as the first political leader among western developed nations since the June 4 Incident.

The *Showa* Emperor passed away on January 7, 1989 and the *Showa* Era was replaced by *Heisei* Era. Sixty-four calendar years of *Showa* (1926-1989) could be divided into two periods: prewar militarism and postwar pacifism. During the *Showa* Era, prewar and almost three decades of postwar periods are characterized as an unhappy period in long history of Japan-China bilateral relations. The year 1992 marked the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations, and an unprecedented event was planned as something symbolic for promoting friendship and goodwill relations in the new era: a visit to China by Their Majesties, Emperor and Empress. The new Emperor Akihito, born in 1933, became the first emperor enthroned under the new peaceful constitution. The June 4 Incident, however, created a barrier for realizing Emperor’s China visit for the Japanese side. There were views among some Japanese, especially conservatives and rightists, that it was premature to promote Emperor’s visit to China. The Japanese government carefully and patiently waited for the

prevailing situations to improve and finally decided that the Emperor and Empress would make an official visit to China on October 23-28, 1992.²⁵ His visit was a great success. China's hospitality was perfect. The Emperor's speech at the welcoming banquet on October 23 hosted by President Yang Shangkun at the Great Hall of the People touched the Chinese participants.²⁶ The Chinese government recognized that the Emperor's speech on historic issues was a further step forward that included a strong sense of remorse though it may not be an apology.²⁷ The Japanese government as well as the public, especially Foreign Ministry officials, including the author, who accompanied the Emperor and became a member of the historic mission were filled with the euphoria that the Emperor's China visit, which they believed was necessary to be made sooner or later at an appropriate matured time, was in fact finally carried out almost perfectly. They also believed that a new forward-looking Japan-China relationship was about to start. The reality, however, was not so simple and easy.

Since the June 4 Incident, the Chinese government further stressed patriotic education for the youth to disseminate the idea that it is the CCP that has played a core role in fighting with western imperialism, especially Japanese militarism, and regained Chinese pride and glory after more than one hundred years of humiliation. As communist ideology almost completely lost its attractiveness among people, the CCP needed a legitimacy to convince people that a present stable and prosperous Chinese society could not have been achieved without its leadership, and only the CCP can provide its people with the assurance that China will keep growing and prospering. When the CCP appeals to people's nationalism, Japan would be in danger of becoming a main scapegoat. Second, international strategic circumstances have fundamentally altered as a result of the end of Cold War. Russia does not pose a greater threat to Japan and China. Third, the Chinese economy expanded almost 10 per cent annually in average since 1978 when reform and openness policy was adopted. Chinese people had more confidence for their future, whereas Japan suffered from long-term economic difficulties after the bubble economy was burst in the early 1990s. The Japanese system, which had functioned effectively and made great contributions to the Japanese miracle in good old days, did not seem to work as they had. A growing number of Japanese were losing confidence in their future. Warm sentiments that had prevailed among both nations towards each other gradually disappeared and nationalisms of Japan and China tended to come into conflict more easily and directly.

The standout event symbolizing the changing atmosphere was Jiang Zemin's state visit to Japan in November 1998 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Peace and Friendship Treaty. Jiang realized a hand-over of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China peacefully and successfully on July 1, 1997. Hong Kong was a symbol of western colonization and China's

humiliating modern history. Therefore, its return to China under Jiang helped him to strengthen his legitimacy as a Chinese leader. Jiang made an official visit to the US from late October to early November in 1997. He started his visit by stopping at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii to remind the American people that China and the US, as allies, fought with the common enemy, Japan during WWII. In his meeting with Clinton, both leaders agreed on the building of “constructive strategic partnership.” The following year, Clinton visited China on June 23 – July 3, 1998 without visiting any other country, including US allies in Asia such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. It was unprecedented that the US president made a foreign visit to any single country for such a long period of time.

President Jiang’s visit to Japan was conducted under such offensive Chinese diplomatic atmosphere. In other words, China did not strongly feel that it was necessary to compromise with Japan. This was the first official visit by a Chinese president to Japan. His visit, which had been originally scheduled in September, was postponed to November due to large flooding in China that he had to tackle. Consequently, a visit to Japan by Korean President Kim Dae Jung preceded Jiang’s visit. Kim visited Japan in October 1998 and in the Joint Declaration issued on October 8, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology to the Korean people for tremendous damage and suffering that Japan had caused.²⁸ Kim accepted Obuchi’s frank and forward-looking statement in a very positive manner and highly appreciated the role that Japan has played for the peace and prosperity of the international community under the postwar Peace Constitution.²⁹

It was unfortunate that the Japan-Korea Joint Declaration became China’s baseline in considering how the past history issue was to be written in the Japan-China Joint Declaration. In the former’s case, Korea responded to Japan’s apology by accepting it with sincerity and highly appreciating a peaceful road Japan has taken after the war, whereas in the latter’s case, China only focused on historic issues and showed no clear interest on future-oriented bilateral relations. In the Japan-China Joint Declaration (JCJD) issued on November 26, regarding the past history issue, the Japanese side expressed deep remorse for the serious distress and damage that Japan had caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China.³⁰ However, the JCJD did not contain an expression of “apology”. Jiang repeated the history issue on various occasions during his visit, including meetings with Obuchi, a lecture at Waseda University, a press conference and furthermore even on the occasion of the welcoming banquet hosted by the Emperor. Not only nationalists and rightists but also a majority of ordinary Japanese and the mass media, in other words, the Japanese mainstream that had had warm sentiments towards China came to be a little bit fed up with statements on the past history repeated by

the Chinese president.³¹ Jiang's state visit to Japan thus is remembered as a disaster for the bilateral relationship. The bilateral relationship gradually became characterized as a conflict of nationalisms, and was in danger of entering into a vicious circle unless both countries managed wisely.

Japan's ODA to China became another target. Japan started its ODA to China in 1979. Since then for thirty years until 2008, Japan provided a total amount of approximately US\$35 billion: ¥3.2 trillion yen loan, ¥147.2 billion grant aid, and ¥150.5 billion technical assistance.³² Japan's ODA has been spent on large-scale infrastructure constructions such as highways, airports, sea ports, power plants and projects in sectors of medicine and the environment, and played an important role in helping China's development and modernization. However, especially since the late 1990s, a necessity to review Japan's ODA to China was often pointed out in Japan for the following reasons. First, the necessity to keep providing China with ODA was challenged because Japan experienced a lost decade and suffered from severe economic and fiscal conditions in the 1990s, whereas China achieved a rapid economic growth during the same period. Second, Japan became more critical about China's compliance with Japan's ODA Charter, which calls for full attention to military expenditures, democratization and basic human rights and freedoms. Third, China, one of the biggest recipients of Japan's ODA, also provided its aid to third countries for political and economic purposes. Fourth, China was reluctant to make publicity efforts within the country on Japan's ODA. And fifth, as a result of Chinese economic development, its priority agenda has shifted from infrastructure constructions in coastal areas to projects for narrowing gap between coastal areas and inland regions, and global issues, etc. As a result of the review process, a new ODA plan to China was drafted, and Japan's ODA to China was gradually reduced in amount. New yen loan projects finally ended in 2007 fiscal year.

Junichiro Koizumi replaced Yoshiro Mori and became the 87th prime minister in April 2001. He used the slogan of "structural reform with no sacred cow" and enjoyed 1,980 days premiership, which ranked the third longest after Eisaku Sato (2,798 days) and Shigeru Yoshida (2,616 days) in post-war Japanese political history. Koizumi approached a rising China in a very positive manner, that is, as a challenge and opportunity rather than a threat. He delivered this message in his speech in front of Zhu Rongji, Chinese Premier, titled "Asia in a New Century: Challenge and Opportunity" at the Boao Forum for Asia, Hainan Island, on April 12, 2002.³³ Koizumi's approach to the past history issue was also very candid and he did not hesitate to admit Japan's mistakes in the past. He visited Beijing on October 8, 2001 and spoke to the press after visiting the Marco Polo Bridge, where Japan-China war broke out on July 7, 1937. At the Anti-Japanese War Memorial nearby he strongly felt the cruelty of the war and watched various displays

in the memorial with a heart-felt apology and regret towards the Chinese victims.³⁴ However, Koizumi's only action that China could never accept was his worship to the Yasukuni Shrine each year during his term. In spite of continuing expansion of bilateral economic relations, political development between Japan and China was very limited and deadlocked during Koizumi's term. Though he remained in power for five years and five months, he could not visit Beijing any more. The Chinese government leaders did not visit Japan during his term, either. This was unprecedented in the bilateral relationship. The Japan-China relationship at that time was often described as "*seirei keinetsu*" or "politically cold, economically hot."

The worsening of the Japan-China relationship was accelerated by a series of events. Five North Korean refugees, including a little girl, attempted to seek asylum at Japanese Consulate General in Shenyang, Liaoning Province on May 8, 2002, but they were blocked by the Chinese security guards inside the area of the consulate general. The video scene was broadcasted by Japanese TV news programmes,³⁵ which created strong criticism among the Japanese public against the Foreign Ministry of Japan for its failure to ensure consular immunities and to protect human rights as well as a negative image of the Chinese authorities. Chinese citizens were reported to be killed and injured by Japanese chemical weapons abandoned during WWII in Qiqihaer, Heilongjiang Province, in August 2003.³⁶ A Japanese company in Osaka organized a tour to Zhuhai, Guangdong Province for its employees in September 2003, and some of them were arrested there for group prostitution.³⁷ In October, a performance of Japanese students and teachers at Xibei University in Xian, Shaanxi Province was misunderstood by Chinese students as ridiculing them, which stimulated Chinese nationalism and caused anti-Japanese demonstration.³⁸ Anti-Japanese behaviour by a Chinese audience at Asia Football Cup in summer 2004 also reflected the worsening sentiments of many Chinese towards Japan.³⁹ A Chinese submarine's interference in Japan's territorial sea occurred in November 2004.⁴⁰ A worldwide campaign for acquiring permanent membership of the UN Security Council by the Japanese government triggered strong opposition by China, and finally led to large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Their actions became escalated to the extent that they even attacked facilities of Japanese Embassy in Beijing and Consulate General in Shanghai in spring 2005.⁴¹ A weekly magazine, *Shukan Bunshun*⁴² reported on December 27, 2005 that a Japanese officer of the Consulate General of Japan in Shanghai committed suicide on May 6 the previous year after being blackmailed by an officer of the Chinese local public safety authorities regarding his inappropriate relations with a Chinese hostess at a *karaoke*-bar. The Foreign Ministry of Japan released a press announcement on this case that there was a violation of the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations

by the Chinese local authorities.⁴³ The Chinese government argued that the Japanese government must have another intention in highlighting the incident one and half years later, which the Chinese government expressed a strong resentment.⁴⁴ The perception of the Japanese general public toward China worsened accordingly as a result of the above-described events. The Cabinet Office (former Prime Minister's Office) of the Japanese government regularly conducts an opinion survey on diplomacy each year. According to the survey in 1980, 78.6 per cent Japanese answered that they had intimate feelings towards China, and only 14.7 per cent said that they did not feel intimacy towards China, while in 2005 the former declined to 32.4 per cent and the latter increased to 63.4 per cent.⁴⁵

4. Win-Win Relations Based on Common Strategic Interests

Shinzo Abe became prime minister in September 2006. In recognition of past history, Abe had been regarded as a more firmly principled, rooted and conservative politician than Koizumi. In fact, Abe, in his policy speech at the Diet stated that he would further promote "assertive diplomacy". Therefore, Abe's approach to China, including the Yasukuni Shrine issue was a bit surprising and unexpected. He announced his ambiguous strategy on the Yasukuni issue: not to confirm whether he would visit or had visited the Yasukuni Shrine. In fact, under this principle, he did not worship the Yasukuni Shrine during his term. The Chinese government accepted Abe's ambiguous strategy. Then he made a surprising announcement that he would visit China in October 2006. It was the first time for a Japanese prime minister to choose China as the first country to visit after assuming a post. Japanese prime minister's visit to Beijing finally resumed for the first time in five years. Abe's China visit was called a visit to "break ice" by the Chinese side. Thus, *seirei keinetsu* or a politically cold, economically hot period under the Koizumi government had finally passed away.

The Joint Press Statement⁴⁶ was issued during Abe's visit to Beijing on October 8. Both sides confirmed that Japan-China relations have become one of their most important bilateral relations. This expression was first adopted orally by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in 1992, but it was written in the document for the first time. Both leaders shared the view that the two countries would strive to build a mutually beneficial relationship based on common "strategic" interests.⁴⁷ In the past, China preferred expressions such as "peace," "friendship" and "goodwill" with neighbouring countries, including Japan. Furthermore, Japan had not been regarded by China as a fully independent actor in international politics, as the former had been obedient to the US foreign policy from China's viewpoint, and could not be described as a "strategic" partner. China started to use the expression, "strategic dialogue"

in 2005 for the title of a vice-foreign minister level's regular meeting between the two governments, but the joint statement during Abe's China visit was the first occasion to describe the Japan-China bilateral relationship as strategic. The joint press statement also included other positive elements. The Japanese side emphasized Japan's peaceful path more than 60 years after the war, which was highly appreciated by the Chinese side. Both sides reaffirmed facilitation of dialogue and consultation in order to make the East China Sea a "Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship". They also agreed to start a joint research of history by Japanese and Chinese scholars. Thus Abe's visit paved a way for a new bilateral relationship that would be guided by strategic rather than emotional considerations. Here "common strategic interests" include bilateral, regional and global areas that would create mutual benefits to both sides and promote a win-win relationship such as the promotion of economic and people-to-people exchanges, the settlement of disputes in a peaceful, cooperative and creative way, the realization of nuclear-free zone of the Korean Peninsula, the deepening of East Asian economic integration, anti-terrorist cooperation, and energy security and climate change.

Abe's visit was followed by Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan in April 2007. His visit was called a visit to "melt ice". Chinese premier's visit was the first time since October 2000. The concrete cooperation package included various programmes, such as the launching of the "Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue", which was to be co-chaired by the Japanese foreign minister and Chinese vice premier and attended by main economic and finance-related ministers of both sides to discuss macro-economy, bilateral trade and investment, energy and the environment, as well as regional and global economic coordination and cooperation. The first meeting was held in Beijing in December 2007. Wen made a speech⁴⁸ in the Japanese Diet on April 12, delivering a very positive message to Japanese political leaders and people. With regard to the past history issue, he spoke that the Japanese government and leaders officially admitted aggression, and expressed their deep remorse and apologies to the damaged countries, which the Chinese government and people highly appreciated. Regarding Chinese development, he said that the Japanese government and people have provided support and assistance to Chinese modernization, which Chinese people would never forget. Hu Jintao made a state visit to Japan in May 2008 to consolidate the new bilateral relationship by issuing the Joint Statement on "Comprehensive Promotion of a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests", followed by a "Joint Press Statement on the Strengthening Exchange and Cooperation", which includes 70 action plans in various fields.⁴⁹ The Joint Statement was regarded by both governments as one among four important basic political documents regulating Japan-China relations since normalization. The three other preceding documents are: the

Joint Communiqué for diplomatic normalization in 1972, the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, and the Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development in 1998.

The general elections of the House of Representatives in Japan were held on August 30, 2009 and the DPJ, the largest opposition, gained a landslide victory, which gained 308 seats out of 480, while the ruling LDP declined to 119 from 300. This was the first time for the LDP to drop from the status of the largest party in the House of Representatives since its founding in 1955, and also the first time to step down from the ruling party except for a period of around a year during 1993 and 1994. Yukio Hatoyama, head of the DPJ, was appointed prime minister and organized a new cabinet on September 16 in coalition with Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party because DPJ members alone did not reach the majority in the House of Councilors. Hatoyama contributed an article entitled "A New Path for Japan" to the op-ed column of *The New York Times*.⁵⁰ He stressed that the Japan-US security pact will continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy, but added that the era of US unilateralism may come to an end. He set up Japan's diplomatic agenda in pursuing its national interest when caught between the US, which is fighting to retain its position as the world's dominant power, and China, which is seeking ways to become dominant. He argued for the creation of an East Asian community as Japan's long-term foreign policy target. In his first meeting with Hu Jintao at New York on September 21, both leaders confirmed the promotion of mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests as a guiding principle even under the Japanese new government.⁵¹ Hatoyama, however, resigned in June 2010 because his drift position on Futenma US Marine Corps Base in Okinawa created a suspicion and even distrust of the US government. Naoto Kan succeeded him and became the sixth prime minister in the last five years. He tried to improve Japan-US relations and also maintained the basic policy on Japan-China relations, but did not take any outstanding initiative because, in addition to a weak domestic political basis after the DPJ lost seats in the elections of House of Councilors in July 2010, he was so preoccupied with damage control of the worsened Sino-Japanese relationship resulting from the collision case of a Chinese fishing boat with Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands that occurred in September 2010 and also with East Japan Great Earthquake related affairs.

5. The US and Japan-China Relations

The Japan-US relationship remains the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy and the most important bilateral relationship for Japan. Japan's greatest diplomatic failure in the early *Showa* era, or from the 1930s to 1945 was

that it conflicted seriously with the US regarding the “China issue”. As early as the 1920s, a Japanese journalist understood this point. Shigeharu Matsumoto, who had been the Shanghai bureau chief of *The Domei Tsusin* (Domei News Agency) in the 1930s, recalled in his memoir that he had reached understanding during his study in the US in 1925 that the main issue if war were to break out between the US and Japan was China as the US would never allow Japan to take so many liberties and dominate the Chinese market.⁵² He recognized that the China issue was a core of Japan-US relations, that is to say, Japan-China relations are another side of Japan-US relations. Relations with the US and China were, and also are Japan’s two most important relations, as they are two sides of the same coin. This situation remains the same in the 21st century.

Chinese people still hold ambivalent sentiments towards Japan, that is, a mixture of inferiority and superiority complexes. China has a traditional ethno-centralism. Chinese use several expressions on Japan when they look down on it. A typical one is “*xiao riben*” (small Japan). China suffered from Western aggression more than a hundred years since the Opium War. The humiliation resulting from invasions by western powers, particularly by Japan left deep scars to Chinese people. Mindless speeches by Japanese politicians and prime ministers’ worship to the Yasukuni Shrine, where fourteen Class A criminals are enshrined, remind Chinese people of a lack of deep remorse for the past by Japan. There is a suspicion and distrust of Japan. As the Chinese economy grows at a rapid speed, Chinese self-confidence also becomes stronger. Chinese are recovering from a trauma of Japanese aggression but it is still not complete. In sum, a lack of mutual trust between both governments and people remains a serious problem.

The US-China relationship is usually guided by strategic considerations, in other words, it is based on mutual interests, while the Japan-China relationship is heavily affected by emotion. The author was in Beijing when NATO mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, and saw furious Chinese students protested and pelt the US Embassy with stones. Just after George Bush Jr. became President in 2001, the US-China relationship worsened when US and Chinese military aircraft crashed near Hainan Island. US military sales to Taiwan became another unstable factor. The Sino-American relationship, however, returned to normal situations after 9/11 as if nothing had happened. The author could hardly believe that a recovery would occur in such a short period if similar incidents occurred between Japan and China. It would surely take a much longer time to heal the damage. The reason is that the US-China relationship is based on strategic considerations, while the Japan-China relationship was an emotionally-driven relationship.

6. Japan and China Need to Overcome Difficulties

There are three thorns, i.e., three main obstacles which could easily harm or destabilize the Japan-China political relationship and consequently the whole relations: the historic issues; the Taiwan issue; and the East China Sea, especially the Senkaku/Diaoyudao issue.

First, regarding the past history issue, inappropriate statements occasionally made by Japanese politicians, including cabinet members, help to convince China that it has a good reason to doubt the sincerity of Japanese on the recognition of Japan's aggression to China before and during WWII. However, there is a perception gap. The Japanese government has repeatedly expressed its basic position on the war on various occasions.⁵³ It is needless to say that the Japanese government should be mindful about the past history issue so that they should not harm the feelings of Chinese people. However, an increasing number of Japanese feel that China exaggerates speeches and actions made by a very small number of rightists who are rather isolated from Japanese society as if they were representing the Japanese mainstream. During the Koizumi administration, the Japan-China relationship entered into political troubles, and the main reason was his regular worship to the Yasukuni Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine has two aspects that Japanese leaders must bear in mind: its sensitivity for neighbouring nations, especially China and Korea; and the necessity to commemorate and honor the Japanese soldiers who died in war. It is natural that government leaders respect those who devoted their lives to their own country. The US has Arlington National Cemetery, while China has the Memorial for the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square in their own capitals. However, for historic reasons, Japanese leaders should be prudent. They should think of a way so that the feelings of the people of neighbouring countries and also of the Japanese who lost family members can be respected at the same time. It should be emphasized, however, that the Yasukuni issue has little to do with a revival of militarism or ultra-nationalism. This may result from a perception gap between Japan and China regarding history. WWII was the Pacific (anti-American) war for Japan, but it was the anti-Japanese war for China. Japan tries to approach history as objectively as possible and the government prefers to leave the judgment of the character of the war for historians' academic research, while the Chinese government tends to see history as lessons for the present. Japanese custom requires people feel solemnly and respect the dead regardless how he or she was treated before death. As for Chinese, evil is evil, a "bad guy" is a "bad guy" even after they die. China often compares German and Japanese attitudes *vis-à-vis* past history, saying that Germany has gained trust from neighbours through the very clear position firmly taken and expressed on historic misdeeds, while Japan is still reluctant to do so. The Japanese side, however, does not necessarily accept such an argument, claiming that what was conducted by Japan and Germany

during the war has different characters, and is not appropriate for a simple comparison. Nazi Germany's massacre of Jewish people in essence had nothing to do with the war itself, while the brutal behaviour of Japanese soldiers mainly resulted from a lack of discipline in the execution of the war. Furthermore, the Japanese government has sincerely resolved the war reparation issues by concluding multilateral or bilateral peace treaties with relevant nations. On the other hand, Germany, having been split into two after the war, chose to pay reparations to individuals without concluding peace treaties with relevant countries.⁵⁴ China's political stance is that Japan's aggression was initiated by a handful of militarists, and that the vast majority of Japanese people are, like Chinese people, the victim of the war. Consensus on the evaluation of the war, however, has not been reached in Japan. China criticizes the fact that Japan does not squarely reflect on the history. Japan complains that China does not fairly evaluate sixty years' of a peaceful road Japan has pursued after WWII, and sometimes uses the history issue for political purposes.

Second, the Taiwan issue is also a very sensitive issue between the two countries as is the case in US-China relationship but not exactly in the same way. When both countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1972, the Joint Communiqué says: "The Government of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China." The Japanese government used an expression "fully understands and respects" instead of "recognizes", because Japan is not in a position to determine the legal status of Taiwan, a sovereignty over which Japan had already renounced as a result of accepting the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Based on this principle, the Japanese government has maintained very careful and restraint approaches in dealing with Taiwan policy. Japan does not support "Two Chinas" or "Taiwan Independence". No single Japanese incumbent cabinet member has ever visited Taiwan since normalization and Japan has not yet received visits of the incumbent Taiwanese president.⁵⁵ It is understandable that China still holds concerns over the development of Japan-Taiwan relations because Taiwan had been a former colony of Japan for fifty years and Taiwanese of older generation like Lee Teng-hui received education under the Japanese rule and their mentality seems to be closer to Japanese rather than to mainland Chinese. The Japanese government should continue to be aware of the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue. However, China's suspicion that Japan still has political motives to expand its influence over Taiwan is unrealistic and entirely wrong. Since Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT was elected president in 2008 after eight years' Chen Shui-bian administration led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), relations across the Taiwan Straits have been improved. It is necessary to examine closely how the development of the cross straits relations will affect Japan-China relations as well as Japan-Taiwan relations.

Third, the East China Sea related issues, especially the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands. The official position of the Japanese government is that there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands, because there is no doubt that the islands are clearly an inherent territory of Japan in light of historical facts and based on international law, and indeed the islands are now under the valid control of Japan.⁵⁶ However, China also claims sovereignty over the islands.⁵⁷ Territorial disputes could easily stimulate nationalism of both sides. A Chinese fishing trawler entered Japan's territorial sea near the Senkaku Islands on September 7, 2010.⁵⁸ It did not obey the instruction by the Japanese Coast Guard and further collided with two Japanese patrol vessels. The captain of the trawler was arrested and taken by the coast guard, together with other fourteen crew members, for investigation. The case was sent to the Japan's public prosecutor's office for obstructing the enforcement of public duties. The fourteen crew members were released with the trawler on September 13, and the prosecutor's office in Naha, Okinawa Prefecture finally released the captain by suspending the legal procedure on September 24.⁵⁹ During and after the incident, the Chinese government, as well as the public strongly protested against the Japanese government's action, by taking counter measures such as postponement of a series of exchanges and meetings, including the suspension of a cabinet minister level exchange, and a substantial embargo of rare earths export to Japan, of which China accounts for 97 per cent of the world's supply.⁶⁰ The Chinese government further requested apology and compensation even after the captain was released. Anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in Chinese cities such as Xian, Chengdu, Zhengzhou, and Wuhan,⁶¹ while anti-Chinese demonstrations were also organized and implemented by protesters in Japan in a more modest and disciplined manner. Both sides should not try to stimulate nationalism of both nationals, and should not lose their greater common strategic interests. This issue should be treated in a cool and restrained manner, otherwise, it would take a longer time for both countries to recover the damage and return to a normal track. With regard to China's military modernization, China has increased its military budget with a double digit for the last 22 consecutive years until 2009. China has a strong preference to create aircraft carriers, by which its navy tries to expand the power projection capability in the East and South Sea and even beyond that. Chinese navy has become active in the region. China needs to explain clearly its intentions to neighbours, including Japan, otherwise a lack of transparency and unclear intention of its actions could lead to unforeseen situations with Japan that seeks for more "normal" sovereign state, including defense policy.⁶²

There are negative and positive scenarios on the future of Japan-China relations. The traditional communist ideology has almost entirely lost

attractiveness among the Chinese people. Making people rich and society prosperous remains the most important task for the CCP. They say that China is implementing “socialist market economy”. It could be interpreted as a state capitalism or capitalism under the strong leadership of the CCP bureaucratic rule. Any policy will be acceptable as long as the CCP can maintain its political control over China and Chinese society can prosper. There is a potential contradiction between market economy and political dictatorship. The market economy can be implemented regardless of the existence of the CCP. Therefore, the CCP would face a legitimacy crisis sooner or later. Its final card is nationalism, in other words, to remind Chinese people that it is the CCP that recovered a national pride and glory by defeating Japanese imperialism and putting an end to over hundred years’ humiliation by western powers since Opium War in 1840-1842. It seems that the CCP itself has been keenly aware of the possible conflicts between economic and political systems unless well prepared in advance, and tries to seek a soft landing. Now the centripetal force is not ideology but nationalism. It means that the CCP needs to emphasize the role of the CCP in the process of defeating Japan and founding a new China. Japan might continue to be a scapegoat for the CCP to maintain its power and legitimacy. That is a negative scenario. But what is dangerous of this approach is that the modern history tells us that anti-Japanese movements and anti-government movements are both sides of the same coin. In the age of globalization with the development of telecommunications and information technologies, including the internet and mobile phones, it has become more and more difficult for the CCP to control people, and it cannot use anti-Japanese movements as a political card to exert its political pressure on Japan as the movement might become beyond the government control and create an unexpected political and social turmoil, which the government never wants to see. A positive scenario should be sought. As China becomes wealthy and Chinese people recover their confidence and play a more important role in the region as well as in the world, it is possible that Chinese complex sentiments towards Japan will be softened and they will treat Japan more coolly and objectively. Both countries will be able to strengthen to build a constructive relationship based on mutual trust and common interests. There are signs for the positive scenario. A famous young Chinese movie director, Lu Chuan shot a movie of Nanjing Incident, titled “*Nanjing! Nanjing!*”, in 2008. The movie attracted a historical number of Chinese audiences after it was screened in early 2009. What was different from the former movies and TV dramas describing Japan-China war period was that Japanese actors were used to play Japanese soldiers, who spoke and behaved in natural and native ways, and a Japanese soldier played a main part of the story. In the past, Japanese soldiers were played by Chinese actors and caricatured as strange, bad and cruel characters. In this movie, however,

there are bad and good Japanese soldiers. They change from ordinary, gentle persons who play with local children and miss their family left in Japan to abnormal soldiers who conduct cruel killings, depending on the situation. The Japanese soldier, the leading character of the movie, finally commits suicide after releasing Chinese prisoners due to major mental strain. There are splits in the evaluation on the movie among Chinese, but the Chinese government took it as one of the ten movies worth watching on the occasion of 60th anniversary of their national foundation. The author interprets, and his counterpart in the Chinese government and academia basically agrees, that one of the backgrounds for a fundamental change of the portrayal of Japanese soldiers in the movie is that more Chinese have been able to face up to an unhappy bilateral history in a less emotional and more balanced way, as they are becoming richer, more confident in China's current and future status, and overcoming complex sentiments towards Japan.

7. Conclusion

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, Japan-China relations experienced a "*heiwa yuko*" (peace and friendship) era in the first two decades and a "*seirei keinetsu*" (politically cold, economically hot) era for almost a decade from the late 1990s until 2006. Japan-China relations then have welcomed an era of "*senryaku teki gokei kankei*" (mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests) since 2006. As Aso said, Japan and China are perpetual neighbours, neither of which can simply relocate.⁶³ It is necessary to manage Japan-China relations looking towards a forward direction based on the following principles.

First, bilateral relations should be guided by common interests, not driven by emotions. Japan-China relations are too important to be influenced by temporary emotional feelings. In other words, they should build matured relations based on common strategic interests rather than emotional relations driven by "like" or "dislike". Both countries need to seek a "plus-sum", not a "zero-sum" relationship. Only win-win situations based on common interests can ensure stable bilateral relations. Second, nevertheless, sensitive issues such as past history, Taiwan or the East China Sea disputes may sometimes shake Japan-China relations. With regard to the historic issue, Japan should squarely face up and firmly maintain the basic position that through its colonial rule and aggression in the past, Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations, and express a deep remorse and heart-felt apology. China, at the same time, needs to appreciate positively Japan's consistent position as a peaceful country since the end of the war, and welcome and support its increasingly active role in the world. Japan is not what it used to be before and during

the war, and China has also risen from being a sleeping lion to a leading powerhouse. Both governments and people should notice that they are already in a new age where they themselves as well as surrounding circumstances have changed and a new thinking is required. Third, in the era of “friendship”, both countries, especially Japan, tended to be self-restrained in dialogue in order not to create tensions. However, strategic relations must be something which allows both sides to exchange views in a frank manner. A wide range of frank and candid communication networks between the governments, business sectors, academia and individuals is necessary for promoting relations based on trust and respect in the true sense of the word. Fourth, Japan-China relations are not only confined to bilateral purposes, but also should contribute to the establishment of a new framework for Asia and the world. Fifth, a government-to-government relationship is critically important but also limited and cannot cover all aspects of Japan-China wide and deep relations. Especially as a result of information technology developments such as mobile phones and internet, it has become more and more important for both governments to address to public diplomacy. The young generation is a main target as they are the source of future leaders. More frequent and large exchanges of youth in both countries are essential to deepen and widen a correct understanding without mutual prejudice.

Almost four decades have passed since Japan and China normalized official relations in 1972. It is indeed amazing to see how much the bilateral relationship has been widened and deepened during that period. Total bilateral trade volume, excluding Hong Kong in 2008 amounted to US\$266.6 billion, which ranked the largest among Japanese bilateral trades and 24.7 per cent larger than Japan-US trade volume. Japanese companies in China employ directly or indirectly 9.2 million Chinese workers.⁶⁴ There are approximately 22,700 Japanese enterprises operating in China as of the end of 2006.⁶⁵ The number of Japanese who visited China in 2007 reached around 4 million, while the number of Chinese who went to Japan in the same year was around 1.21 million. According to the winter 2008 air flight schedule, 635 total carriers including 297 Japanese and 338 Chinese carriers flew every week between 18 Japanese and 22 Chinese airports, and the number of passengers in 2007 reached 7.37 million.⁶⁶ There were 125,417 Japanese citizens registered to Japanese Embassy and Consulates General in China, including Hong Kong in 2007, which accounted for 11.8 per cent of total Japanese registered overseas. Chinese citizens registered to the Japanese Immigration Authorities as long-term residents amounted to 606,889 as of the end of 2007, which surpassed Korean citizens and have become the largest foreign group in Japan for the first time since 1959 when the authorities started to count registered foreigners. Around 90,000 Chinese studied in Japan, while 18,000

Japanese studied in China in 2008. As of February 2008, 332 pairs of local governments in both countries have established sister city relations.⁶⁷ Those trends will continue in the future, and Japan-China relations will be more closely interconnected. Now the time has come for both states to be able to make the best use of the advantage as neighbours.

Japan's relationship with the US and China determined Japan's destiny in early 20th century. This still remains valid now. The worst and greatest failure of Japanese diplomacy and military in early *Showa* era is that Japan's China policy seriously conflicted with the US to the extent that the bilateral relationship became impossible to recover and maintain, and led to the Pacific War. How to keep an appropriate distance and closeness with China is an important but difficult task for Japanese diplomacy. Now it seems that many Japanese are confused and embarrassed by a new situation where they are going to encounter a "strong China" for the first time in more than a hundred years since the first Japan-China War in the late 19th century. China was dominant in East Asian tributary system before the Opium War. In fact, China occupied around 30 per cent of global GDP a few hundred years ago.⁶⁸ The Japanese Empire advanced into a "weak" China from the late 19th century to the early 20th century. Now East Asia has entered an unprecedented new period when two "strong" Asian nations are destined to coexist. The Japanese perception towards China often swings between positive and negative directions. Japan needs to take a well-balanced approach towards China based on common strategic interests rather than swinging sentiments. Public support is essential to diplomacy. It is, however, dangerous if diplomacy is driven by temporary public enthusiasm, because diplomacy is a cool and realistic professional art for coordinating national interests with foreign states though important foreign policies need to be politically authorized with the trust of the people through elections.

Japan's diplomatic option is not "US or China", but "US and China". Having said that, the US remains the best and strongest partner for Japan. Both countries share common values such as democracy, freedom, human rights and market economy. In addition, the security relationship with the US is a cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy and is indeed critical for Japan's survival. On the other hand, Japan does not share basic values with China. Furthermore, China poses uncertainty to Japan. However, it does not mean that Japan should become "anti-China" or confront China. Japan needs to maintain and strengthen the relationship with the US on one hand, and at the same time there are various areas where Japan and China should and can cooperate with each other on a bilateral, regional and global basis from the viewpoint of common strategic interests. This is the most realistic and wise option for Japanese diplomacy.

Notes

- * Dr Kazuyuki Katayama 片山和之 is Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission of the Japanese Embassy in Belgium. He obtained his Bachelor of Law from Kyoto University, Master of Arts from Harvard University and PhD from the University of Malaya. He also studied in the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Beijing Languages Institute and Peking University. As a Japanese career diplomat, he served in Hong Kong, Beijing, Washington DC and Kuala Lumpur. More than a third of his career was focused on China, including four-time work experiences in Beijing and twice at the China desk in Tokyo. He was also in charge of economic affairs, export control, energy security, public relations as well as cultural affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo and the overseas missions. His current mission in the embassy is to follow Belgian and Belgo-Japanese affairs and Japan's cooperation with NATO as well as internal administration. <Email: kazuyuki.katayama@mofa.go.jp>
1. Henry Kissinger. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994, p. 726.
 2. Kazankai. *Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1949-1997* (Basic Documents of Japan-China Relations 1949-1997). Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998, p. 873.
 3. Gerald L. Curtis. *U.S. Policy toward Japan from Nixon to Clinton: An Assessment*. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000, p. 8.
 4. Henry Kissinger. *Years of Renewal*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999, p. 84.
 5. *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 6, 1972.
 6. Preamble of the Joint Communiqué states: "The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself."
 7. Article 2 of the Joint Communiqué states: "The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China."
 8. Article 3 of the Joint Communiqué states: "The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation."
 9. Article 8 of Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945, which Japan had accepted, states that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the island of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." The Cairo Declaration on November 27, 1943 refers to Taiwan that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."
 10. Kazankai. *Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1949-1997* (Basic Documents of Japan-China Relations 1949-1997). Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998, p. 431.
 11. Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué states: "The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan."

12. Article 11 of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China states that issues arising out of the existence of the state of war between Japan and the Republic of China shall be resolved in accordance with relevant provisions of San Francisco Peace Treaty. Article 14 (b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty states that the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war.
13. Kazankai. *Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu 1949-1997* (Basic Documents of Japan-China Relations 1949-1997). Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998, p. 431.
14. The public announcement on the result of the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, passed on December 22, 1978 stressed on the construction of socialist modernization, and economic and technological revolution as the next party mission.
15. Deng Xiaoping changed the tone of economic development from political dogmatism to pragmatic approach. His “cat theory” is popular for describing a new approach. He is said to have spoken: “It does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.”
16. Speech to the British House of Commons on March 1, 1848.
17. In April 1978, approximately 100 to 200 Chinese fishing boats suddenly entered the territorial sea of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands, over which Japan has exercised its control and both nations claim the sovereignty. The Chinese government later explained it was accidental, and the boats all left the area. Nobuyuki Sugimoto, the former consul-general in Shanghai and Japanese China-hand diplomat who was working at China Division of the Foreign Ministry, wrote in his book that Japan’s Coast Guard found out that the fishing boats had received instructions via radio from naval bases in Yantai, Shandong Province and Xiamen, Fujian Province. (杉本信行 (Sugimoto, Nobuyuki). *大地の咆哮 Daichi no Hoko* (Cry from Earth). Tokyo: PHP, 2006, pp. 62-63) Deng Xiaoping, in his press conference in Tokyo on October 25, 1978 during his visit to Japan for exchanging documents of Peace and Friendship Treaty said that it would be appropriate to put this issue aside temporarily or even ten years as the next generation would be wiser than the current generation. (*Asahi Shimbun*, October 26, 1978) The Japanese government, however, maintains the position that no territorial issue exists between Japan and China as it is clear that *the Senkaku* belongs to Japan historically as well as from the viewpoint of international law, and in fact Japan physically controls the islands.
18. The Japanese media reported in June 1982 that the Ministry of Education forced textbook publishing companies to revise the expression on Japan-China War from “aggression” to “advancement” in history textbooks for senior high schools. The Chinese government started to criticize a month later. The initial report by the media proved to be incorrect, but Kiichi Miyazawa, then chief cabinet secretary issued a statement on August 26, 1982, promising that the Japanese government would listen to criticisms by Asian neighbours earnestly and correct as appropriate. The issue thus started to calm down.
19. Eleven out of fifteen post war prime ministers had visited the Yasukuni Shrine under the private title or without making clear their character of the visit until

- Nakasone carried out the official visit in 1985. Fourteen Class A criminals were enshrined to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1978, and the Chinese government started to strongly oppose prime minister's visit regardless of its character, official or private since Nakasone's worship. Since then only two incumbent prime ministers, Hashimoto and Koizumi visited the shrine. Emperor has not visited the shrine since Class A criminals proved to be enshrined.
20. The Kokaryo Dormitory was at Kyoto and originally provided for Chinese students during WWII. After the war, it was registered under the name of the "Republic of China" in 1961, but when Cultural Revolution started in mainland in 1966, conflicts occurred between residents supporting the CCP and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Therefore, the government of Republic of China sued those CCP supporters, requesting the vacation of the dormitory in 1967. However, as a result of normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, a legal status of the "government of Republic of China" in Japan was disputed with regard to ownership of the dormitory. Several judgments were done in courts, but a legal settlement is not yet completed.
 21. Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and Premier, visited China in September 1959 on his way back from the first US visit. He left China on the third day of a planned seven days visit as Sino-Soviet split worsened. In 1960, he decided to pull Soviet experts from China.
 22. June 4 Incident is a series of demonstrations for pro-democracy and anti-corruption initiated by students and intellectuals, and supported by citizens in and near Tiananmen Square as well as main cities in China, which was intensified by the death of Hu Yaobang, the former General Secretary of the CCP on April 15, 1989. However, martial law was declared on May 19, and the military finally cleared Tiananmen Square on June 4. Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary was dismissed for his pro-demonstrations approach. The number of dead remains unclear though the Chinese government officially announced that there were 319 killed in the incident but no deaths in the square. The Chinese government was confronted with strong criticisms from the rest of the world, but it has maintained its position that the incident was an anti-revolutionary rebellion.
 23. The decisions were made at the Fourth Plenary of 13th Party Congress held in Beijing on June 23 to 24. This was the first official meeting of the CCP since June 4 Incident though an irregular Politburo Enlargement Meeting was convened on June 19 to 21.
 24. Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan. (May 15, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/past_summit/15/e15_e.html)
 25. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's Statement on August 25, 1992 regarding Visit to China by Their Majesties, Emperor and Empress.
 26. Regarding history, Emperor spoke that in the long history of bilateral relations, there was an unhappy period when Japan gave a great suffering to Chinese people, which he deeply deploras.
 27. Qian Qichen. *Waijiao Shiji* (Ten Stories of a Diplomat). Beijing: Beijing Zhishi Chubanshe, 2003, p. 195.
 28. Article 2 of the Joint Declaration. (June 5, 2009, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html>)

29. Article 3 of the Joint Declaration. (June 5, 2009, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html>)
30. Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, November 26, 1998.
31. Akihiko Tanaka. *Asia no Naka no Nippon* (Japan in Asia). Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 2007, p. 288.
32. Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan. (May 15, 2009, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/data/gaiyou/odaproject/aisa/china/index>)
33. Prime Minister Koizumi spoke at the forum: "Some see the economic development of China as a threat. I do not. I believe that its dynamic economic development presents challenges as well as opportunity for Japan. I believe a rising economic tide and expansion of the market in China will stimulate competition and will prove to be a tremendous opportunity for the world economy as a whole ... I see the advancement of Japan-China economic relations, not as a hollowing-out of Japanese industry, but as an opportunity to nurture new industries in Japan and to develop their activities in the Chinese market. Our integrated efforts for economic reform in both countries should advance the wheel of economic relations."
34. 飯島勲 (Iijima, Isao), 実録小泉外交 *Jitsuroku Koizumi Gaiko* (Documentary Koizumi Diplomacy). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Shuppansha, 2007, p. 36.
35. A Japanese journalist, who had been informed of the attempted asylum in advance, shot the scene at the site.
36. Forty-four Chinese citizens were reported to get injured by abandoned Japanese chemical weapons at Qiqihaer on August 4, 2003, out of whom a person was dead. (Xinhua News Agency, March 18, 2006)
37. Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed a strong resentment to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing on September 29. (*Mainichi Shimbun*, September 29, 2003, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 9, 2003)
38. Several hundreds of Chinese students marched in the city for requesting an apology from the relevant Japanese. Chinese Foreign Ministry requested to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to take appropriate measures. The university decided to fire the Japanese teacher and remove the three students from the university. (*Asahi Shimbun*, October 31, 2003, *People's Daily* (Japanese edition), November 1, 2003.)
39. The final game of Asia Football Cup was held in Beijing on August 7, 2004 and Japan defeated China by 3 to 1. At the stadium, Japan's national anthem was not heard because of heavy booing, Japan's national flags were burnt down, Japanese supporters could not leave the stadium for a few hours after the game for safety reason, and an Embassy car for Deputy Chief of Mission was attacked and had its window broken. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 8, 2004)
40. A Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces plane found a nuclear submarine interfering Japan's territorial sea in Okinawa on November 10, 2004. The Chinese government expressed a regret, explaining that it occurred for a technical reason. (Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan (May 20, 2010, http://www.mofa-go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_0411.html))
41. The Chinese government expressed sympathy and regret but insisted that the Chinese side was not responsible for the incident, and Japan should squarely face

- history. (Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan (May 20, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/j_kogi01.html)
42. *Shukan Bunshun* (Weekly Bunshun), January 5 and 12, 2006.
 43. Press Release by Foreign Ministry of Japan on December 31, 2005. (Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan, February 16, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/17/ris_1231a.html)
 44. Press Conference by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Qing Gang on December 30, 2005. (Website of Foreign Ministry of China, February 16, 2010, <http://sf.chinaconsulatesf.org/chin/gxh/wzb/fyrbt/dhdw/t228826.htm>)
 45. 外交に関する世論調査 *Gaiko ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa* (*Public Survey on Diplomacy*) in 1980 and 2005, conducted by Cabinet Office (former Prime Minister's Office). (<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey>)
 46. There are Japanese and Chinese texts. English provisional translation is also available in the website of Foreign Ministry of Japan. (May 10, 2009, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0610.html>)
 47. The author worked for the Japanese Embassy in Beijing from 1997 to 1999, and remembers that in the process of negotiation with Chinese counterpart for drafting a joint declaration to be issued on the occasion of Chinese President, Jiang Zemin's official visit to Japan in November 1998, the Chinese side never preferred using the word "strategic" in its relations with Japan in spite of the fact that this expression was used in its relations with great powers such as the US and Russia.
 48. Website of Foreign Ministry of China. (January 7, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_25/1209/t310780.htm)
 49. Website of Foreign Ministry of Japan. (January 7, 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html>)
 50. *The New York Times*, August 27, 2009.
 51. Foreign Ministry of Japan. Outline of Japan-China Summit Meeting, September 22, 2009. (October 1, 2009, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/0909_sk.html)
 52. Shigeharu Matsumoto, *Shanghai Jidai* (Shanghai Period), Vol. 1. Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1974, pp. 18-19.
 53. The following are examples of what has been written or spoken by the Japanese government and leaders on the past history issue:

"The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself." (Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, on September 29, 1972)

"In the long history of relationship between our two countries, there was an unfortunate period, in which my country inflicted great sufferings on the people of China. I deeply deplore this." (Speech by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at a welcoming dinner hosted by Chinese President Yang Shangkun, on October 23, 1992)

"Japan ..., through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistakes be made in the future, I (Prime

Minister Murayama) regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.” (Statement by Prime Minister Murayama on the occasion of 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, on August 15, 1995)

“The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this.” (Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, on November 26, 1998)

“I looked at the exhibitions with heart felt apology and condolences to those Chinese people who were sacrificed during Japanese aggression.” (Prime Minister Koizumi’s interview after visiting the Memorial Museum for the Anti-Japanese War in Beijing on October 8, 2001)

54. According to the Foreign Ministry of Japan, both Japan and Germany have sincerely responded to the past history issue. But at the same time, Japan and Germany are completely different in what occurred during the war, and how they resolved the issue after the war under respective situations. Japan resolved the issues such as war reparation through bilateral and multilateral peace treaties such as San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was a generally accepted way. For examples, through San Francisco Treaty, Japan paid reparations to the Philippines (US\$550 million), Vietnam (US\$39 million) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (£4.5 million). Japan also abandoned its assets overseas (US\$23.681 billion). Through bilateral treaties, Japan paid US\$200 million to Burma and US\$223 million to Indonesia. (Website of the Foreign Ministry of Japan (May 21, 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/qa/03.html>)) Germany, which had been divided into two after the war, could not solve the issue in the same manner. Germany, therefore, provided individual compensations. Thus Japan and Germany were in different situations, and it is not appropriate to simply compare and evaluate the two countries’ approach. (Foreign Ministry of Japan. *Past History Questions and Answers*, May 21, 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/qa/10.html>)
55. The Japanese government did not permit Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Japan while he was President. As of January 2010, he visited Japan five times, but only after he resigned in March 2000, i.e., in April 2001, December 2004-January 2005, May-June 2007, September 2008, and in September 2009.
56. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Recent Developments in Japan-China Relations: Basic Facts on the Senkaku Islands and the Recent Incident*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 2010, p. 7. The Senkaku Islands are not included in the territory which Japan renounced under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. They were under the US administration as a part of Okinawa until 1972 when they returned to Japan. China expressed no objection to the status of the islands under US administration. In fact, it was not until 1970, when the possibility of petroleum resources on the continental shelf surrounding the islands came to surface, that China began to claim the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.

57. China claims that the Diaoyu Islands have been in its territory ever since the early period of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and Japan illegally took over the islands as subsidiary islands of Taiwan in 1895 after the Shimonoseki Treaty was signed as a result of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. It insists that San Francisco Treaty was unlawful and illegitimate and Okinawa Reversion Agreement between Japan and the US in 1971 was a blatant infringement on China's territorial sovereignty. The Chinese government has been resolutely fighting over its sovereignty rights as it believes that Japan continues its unlawful occupation of the islands. (China Daily, October 12, 2010)
58. Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (October 19, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/r-relations/major_e.html)
59. Deputy of Okinawa District Public Prosecutor's Office made a press conference on September 24, explaining that the Chinese captain was released because his action was not taken based on a well prepared plan but for escaping from the chase of the Japanese coast guard, and the prosecutor's office also took into consideration a possible impact of the case on Japanese nationals as well as future Japan-China relations. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 24, 2010) The spokesman denied a political decision was made for the captain's release, but a "consideration" on "future Japan-China relations" is extraordinary for the public prosecutor's office as a decision factor and some suspect that it indicates a possible highly political instruction was delivered to the prosecutor's office. Naoto Kan, prime minister, however, replied in New York on September 24 that it was a decision made solemnly by the public prosecutor's office that took into general considerations characters of the case and relevant laws and regulations. (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 25, 2010) Thus he denied a political pressure by the government high profiles to the public prosecutor's office.
60. The Chinese authorities denied the embargo of rare earths though the customs authorities did not authorize the export of rare earths to Japan for certain period after the case took place.
61. The Chinese government expressed understanding on Chinese people's righteous indignation but at the same time pointed out that the government would not support irrational and illegal actions to express patriotism. (Press spokesperson, Mr Ma Chaoxu's remarks on October 16, 2010, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/t761694.htm>)
62. "National Defense Program Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2011 and Beyond" approved by the Japanese Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010 warns that "China is steadily increasing its defense expenditure. China is widely and rapidly modernizing its military force, mainly its capability for extended-range power projection. In addition, China has been expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in the surrounding waters. These trends, together with insufficient transparency over China's military forces and its security policy, are of concern for the regional and global community." (Website of Japan's Ministry of Defense, June 14, 2011, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/index.html>)
63. Remarks "My Personal Conviction regarding Japan-China Relations" by Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan at the reception to commemorate the 30th

- anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, at Great Hall of the People, Beijing, on October 24, 2008. (September 9, 2009, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/address0810.html>)
64. Bo Xilai, then Chinese Commerce Minister's statement in *People's Daily*, April 23, 2005.
 65. *Chinese Trade Statistics 2007*.
 66. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan and China: Building a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009.
 67. Statistics by Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (Japan).
 68. Speech by Dai Bingguo, State Councilor of China at ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta on January 22, 2010. (Website of Foreign Ministry of China, February 5, 2010, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zyxw/t653376.htm>)

References

English Language Sources

- Baker, James A. (1995), *The Politics of Diplomacy*, New York: Putnam.
- Bergsten, C. Fred *et al.* (2008), *China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities*, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Burr, William (1999), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow*, New York: The New Press.
- Bush, Richard C. (2010), *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Bush, Richard C. and Michael E. O'Hanlon (2007), *A War Like No Other – The Truth About China's Challenge To America*, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Calder, Kent E. (2009), *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Emmott, Bill (2008), *Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade*, London: Penguin Books.
- Fishman, Ted C. (2005), *China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World*, New York: Scribner.
- Halper, Stefan (2010), *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Basic Books.
- He, Yinnan (2009), *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jacques, Martin (2009), *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*, New York: The Penguin Press.
- Kang, David C. (2007), *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Khalilzad, Zulm M. *et al.* (1999), *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications*, Santa Monica: RAND.
- Kirby, William C., Robert S. Ross and Gong Li (2005), *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations*, Cambridge: The Harvard University Asia Center.

- Kissinger, Henry (2011), *On China*, New York: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Lam, Peng Er *et al.* (2006), *Japan's Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power*, New York: Routledge.
- Lee, Poh Ping (2005), *Facing the Dragon: Asean and Japan, and the Rise of China*, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
- Mann, James (2007), *The China Fantasy*, New York: Viking.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (2011), *The Future of Power*, New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Platt, Nicholas (2010), *China Boys: How U.S. Relations with the PRC Began and Grew*, Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing.
- Ross, Robert S. *et al.* (2008), *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, New York: Cornell University.
- Shirk, Susan L. (2007), *China: Fragile Superpower*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sutter, Robert G. (2008), *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War*, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Sutter, Robert G. (2009), *The United States in Asia*, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Sutter, Robert G. (2010), *U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present*, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Japanese Language Sources

- 呉軍華 (Go, Gunka) 『中国 静かなる革命』 (Chugoku Shizuka Naru Kakumei) 日本経済新聞出版社 2008
- 本田善彦 (Honda, Yoshihiko) 『人民解放軍は何を考えているのか』 (Jinmin Kaihogun Wa Nani O Kangaeteirunoka) 光文社 2008
- 細谷千博 (Hosoya, Chihiro) 『日本外交の軌跡』 (Nihon Gaiko No Kiseki) 日本放送出版協会 1993
- 井上寿一 (Inoue, Toshikazu) 『アジア主義を問いなおす』 (Asia Shugi O Toinaosu) 筑摩書房 2006
- 五百旗頭真 (Iokibe, Makoto) 編 『戦後日本外交史 (新版)』 (Sengo Nihon Gaikoshi) 有斐閣 2006
- 関志雄 (Kan, Shiyu) ・ 朱建榮 (Shu, Kenei) 編 『中国の経済大論争』 (Chugoku No Keizai Daironso) 勁草書房 2008
- 関志雄 (Kan, Shiyu) 『チャイナ・アズ・ナンバーワン』 (China As No. 1) 東洋経済新報社 2009
- 片山和之 (Katayama, Kazuyuki) 『ワシントンから眺めた中国』 (Washington Kara Nagameta Chugoku) 東京図書出版会 2003
- 川島真 (Kawashima, Shin) 『中国の外交：自己認識と課題』 (Chugoku No Gaiko: Jiko Ninshiki To Kadai) 山川出版社 2007
- 霞山会 (Kazankai) 『日中関係基本資料集 1949年-1997年』 (Nicchu Kankei Kihon Shiriyoshu 1949 Nen - 1997 Nen) 財団法人霞山会 1998

- 小原雅博 (Kohara, Masahiro) 『東アジア共同体：強大化する中国と日本の戦略』 (Higashi Asia Kyodotai Kyodaika Suru Chugoku To Nihon No Senryaku) 日本経済新聞出版社 2005
- 松本重治 (Matsumoto, Shigeharu) 『上海時代：ジャーナリストの回想』 (上) (Shang-hai Jidai: Journalist No Kaiso) (Vol. 1) 中央公論社 1974
- 道上尚史 (Michigami, Hisashi) 『外交官が見た「中国人の対日観」』 (Gaikokan Ga Mita Chugokujin No Tainichikan) 文藝春秋社 2010
- 宮本雄二 (Miyamoto, Yuji) 『これから、中国とどう付き合うか』 (Korekara, Chugoku To Dou Tsukiau Ka) 日本経済新聞出版社 2011
- 中嶋嶺雄 (Nakajima, Mineo) 『中国：歴史・社会・国際関係』 (Chugoku: Rekishi・Shakai・Kokusaikankei) 中央公論社 1982
- 岡田実 (Okada, Minoru) 『日中関係とODA：対中ODAをめぐる政治外交史入門』 (Nicchū Kankei To ODA Taichū ODA O Meguru Seiji Gaikoshi Nyumon) 日本僑報社 2008
- 関山健 (Sekiyama, Takashi) 『日中の経済関係はこう変わった：対中国円借款30年の軌跡』 (Nicchū No Keizai Kankei Wa Ko Kawatta Tai Chugoku Enshakkan 30 Nen No Kiseki) 高文研 2008
- 清水美和 (Shimizu, Yoshikazu) 『「中国問題」の内幕』 (Chugoku Mondai No Uchimaku) 筑摩書房 2008
- 清水美和 (Shimizu, Yoshikazu) 『「中国問題」の核心』 (Chugoku Mondai No Kakushin) 筑摩書房 2009
- 進藤榮一 (Shindo, Eiichi) 『東アジア共同体をどうつくるか』 (Higashi Asia Kyodotai O Dou Tsukuru Ka) 筑摩書房 2007
- 城山秀巳 (Shiroyama, Hidemi) 『中国共産党「天皇工作」秘録』 (Chugoku Kyosanto Tenno Kosaku Hiroku) 文藝春秋社 2009
- 田中明彦 (Tanaka, Akihiko) 『アジアの中の日本』 (Asia No Nakano Nihon) NTT出版 2007
- 田中均 (Tanaka, Hitoshi) 『外交の力』 (Gaiko No Chikara) 日本経済新聞出版社 2009
- 谷口誠 (Taniguchi, Makoto) 『東アジア共同体：経済統合のゆくえと日本』 (Higashi Asia Kyodotai Keizai Togo No Yukue To Nihon) 岩波書店 2004
- 渡辺利夫 (Watanabe, Toshio) 『新脱亜論』 (Shin Datsua Ron) 文芸春秋社 2008

Chinese Language Sources

- 楚树龙 (Chu, Shulong) 编 《中国外交战略和政策》 (China's Foreign Strategy and Policy) Beijing: 时事出版社 2008
- 贺雄飞 (He, Xiongfei) 《中国为什么不高兴：中华复兴时代知识分子的文化主张》 (Why China Is Not Happy: Cultural Opinion of Intellectuals in the Age of China's Renaissance) Beijing: 世界知识出版社 2009
- 黄大慧 (Huang, Dahui) 《日本大国化趋势与中日关系》 (Japan's Power Building-up and Sino-Japanese Relationship) Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 2008
- 黄大慧 (Huang, Dahui) 编 《中日友好交流三十年 文化教育与民间交流卷》 (The 30th Anniversary of Friendly Sino-Japan Communication Cultural, Educational and Folk Communication 1978-2008) Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 2008

- 小原雅博 (Kohara, Masahiro) 《日本走向何方》(Where Japan Goes) Beijing: 中信出版社 2009
- 李岚清 (Li, Lanqing) 《突围》(Break Siege) Beijing: 中央文献出版社 2008
- 刘江永 (Liu, Jiangyong) 《中日关系二十讲》(20 Lectures of Sino-Japanese Relations) Beijing: 中国人民大学出版社 2007
- 刘江永 (Liu, Jiangyong) 《当代日本对外关系》(Contemporary Japanese Foreign Relations) Beijing: 世界知识出版社 2009
- 牛军 (Niu, Jun) 编《后冷战时代的中国外交》(China's Diplomacy in the Post Cold War Years) Beijing: 北京大学出版社 2009
- 裴华 (Pei, Hua) 编《中日外交风云中的邓小平》(Deng Xiaoping in Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations) Beijing: 中央文献出版社 2002
- 钱其琛 (Qian, Qichen) 《外交十记》(Ten Stories of a Diplomat) Beijing: 世界知识出版社 2003
- 秦亚青 (Qin, Yaqing) 编《国际体系与中国外交》(International System and China's Diplomacy) Beijing: 世界知识出版社 2009
- 尚书 (Shang, Shu) 《美日同盟关系走向》(Trends for the US-Japan Alliance Relations) Beijing: 时事出版社 2009
- 宋晓军 (Song, Xiaojun) 等《中国不高兴: 大时代、大目标及我们的内忧外患》(Unhappy China: The Great Times, Grand Vision and Our Challenge) Nanjing: 江苏人民出版社 2009
- 唐家璇 (Tang, Jiaxuan) 《劲雨煦风》(Heavy Rain and Warm Wind) Beijing: 世界知识出版社 2009
- 陶文钊 (Tao, Wenzhao) 何兴强 (He Xingqiang) 《中美关系史》(A History of China-US Relations) Beijing: 中国社会科学出版社 2009
- 王泰平 (Wang, Taiping) 《风月同天: 话说中日关系》(Wind and Moon in the Same Sky: Stories about Sino-Japanese Relations) Beijing: 世界知识出版社 2010
- 王海涛 (Wang, Haitao) 《日本改变中国》(Japan Changes China) Beijing: 中国友谊出版公司 2009
- 王锦思 (Wang, Jinsi) 《日本行, 中国更行》(China & Japan) Qingdao: 青岛出版社 2010
- 王新生 (Wang, Xinsheng) 编《中日友好交流三十年 政治卷》(The 30th Anniversary of Friendly Sino-Japan Communication Politics 1978-2008) Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 2008
- 王逸舟 (Wang, Yizhou) 编《中国对外关系转型30年 1978-2008》(Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008) Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 2008
- 王逸舟 (Wang, Yizhou) 谭秀英 (Tan Xiuying) 编《中国外交六十年: 1949-2009》(Sixty Years of China's Foreign Affairs : 1949-2009) Beijing: 中国社会科学出版社 2009
- 吴建民 (Wu, Jianmin) 《外交案例》(Case Study in Diplomacy) Beijing: 中国人民大学出版社 2007
- 徐万胜 (Xu, Wansheng) 编《冷战后的日美同盟与中国周边安全》(The Japan-US Alliance and the Security Environment around China in the Post-Cold War Era) Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 2009
- 颜声毅 (Yan, Shengyi) 《当代中国外交 第二版》(Contemporary Foreign Affairs of China) Shanghai: 复旦大学出版社 2009

- 游博 (You, Bo) 《崛起中的中日关系》(Rising Relations of China and Japan) Beijing: 世界知识出版社 2009
- 张季风 (Zhang, Jifeng) 编 《中日友好交流三十年 经济卷》(The 30th Anniversary of Friendly Sino-Japan Communication Economy 1978-2008) Beijing: 社会科学文献出版社 2008

Glossary

- Abe Shinzō 安倍 晋三
Asahi Shimbun 朝日新聞
 Dōmei Tsūshinsha 同盟通信社
 en (yen) 円 / 圓
 Fukuda Takeo 福田 赳夫
 Hatoyama Yukio 鳩山由紀夫
 Heisei 平成
heiwa yuko 平和友好
ichii taisui 一衣帶水
 Kaifu Toshiki 海部俊樹
 Kan Naoto 菅直人
 Koizumi Junichiro 小泉 純一郎
 Kokaryo 光華寮
 Kyōto 京都
Mainichi Shimbun 毎日新聞
 Miyazawa Kiichi 宮澤喜一
 Mori Yoshirō 森喜朗
 Naha-shi 那霸市
nicchu yuko sese daidai 日中友好世世代代
 Obuchi Keizō 小淵惠三
 Ōhira Masayoshi 大平正芳
 Okinawa-ken 沖繩県
 Ōsaka 大阪
 Satō Eisaku 佐藤榮作
seirei keinetsu 政冷經热
 Senkaku Shotō 尖閣諸島
senryaku teki gokei kankei 戰略的互惠關係
 Shimonoseki Jōyaku 下関条約
 Shōwa 昭和
Shukan Bunshun 週刊文春
 Tanaka Kakuei 田中角榮
 Tōkyō 東京
 Waseda Daigaku 早稲田大学
 Yasukuni Jinja 靖国神社
Yomiuri Shimbun 読売新聞
 Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂

