

## **A Socio-Political Approach to Cultural Resurgence in Contemporary China: Case Study of the Approval of Traditional Festivals as Public Holidays**

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### **Abstract**

This study explores the revival of traditional culture in contemporary China using a socio-political approach. It challenges the Instrumentalist view that the Chinese government has been the main pusher for the revival of traditional culture. By examining a typical case, the Chinese Government's approval of traditional festivals as public holidays, it has found that the ordinary citizens' increasing identity with traditional culture, which arose out of their disillusion with the official Marxist ideology, has served as the fundamental force for the approval, and that the intellectuals, by instrumentally framing and promoting the public support, have played a leading role in influencing government policies. However, the government was far less enthusiastic and active in the whole process as the Instrumentalist theories presuppose. The reason for the discrepancy, as has been analyzed by the article, is that the Chinese government is not a unified whole with a common interest. Rather, it is a diversified body with contrasting interests. Though the cultural sector of the government endorsed the policy shift to boost cultural revival, the economic sector strongly opposed it. Besides, the local government, out of their self-interest, also stood against the policy change. With this conclusion, this study also contradicts the Instrumentalists' assumption of the overall dominance of the Chinese State over society.

**Keywords:** *Instrumentalism, Primordialism, traditional festivals, ordinary citizens, intellectuals, Chinese government*

**JEL classification:** *A13, H10, P37, Z13*

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Since the beginning of this century, Chinese traditional culture has experienced an unprecedented resurgence in contemporary China. Various traditional customs and festivals began to resume their old glory and so did traditional thoughts such as Confucianism. This cultural nostalgia, within less than a decade, has quickly swept all over the country and become one of the most powerful ideological trends among the contemporary Chinese society (Xiao, 2008).

However, for most part of the last century, from the May 4th movement in 1919 to the June 4th movement in 1989, Chinese traditional culture has been generally considered as the roots of China's backwardness and would therefore need to be eradicated. Only about 20 years ago, "regenerating traditional Chinese culture" was just raised by a small group of Chinese intellectuals. But now within only 10 years of the new century, it has ascended as an influential ideological trend in contemporary China.

What has caused the swift change? And what was the role of the Chinese government in the change? In this regard, there has been a heated scholarly debate. The two sides of the debate are Instrumentalists and Primordialists. The Instrumentalist school argued that the Chinese government had played a decisive or at least conducive role in the rise of traditional culture. Barme (2009), for example, argued that the Chinese government guided and aptly manipulated the cultural nationalist artists through a forensic analysis of a typical case, the opening ceremony of the 29th Olympiad in Beijing. He showed how this ceremony, a full representation of the regenerating traditional culture, was "created under Party fiat with the active collaboration of local and international arts figures" (Barme, 2009: 64). Meissner also commented that the government's funding for large-scale research activities and programmes for developing neo-Confucianism in China is the Chinese government's deployment of Confucianism as "an instrument to counter Western influence" (Meissner, 1999: 18). Similarly, Min and Galikowski (2001) also claimed that "the Confucian tradition has been revived by the authorities as an important cultural source from which a new national identity can be constructed" (p. 160).

The Primordialist school, however, believed that the Chinese government was largely invisible in the cultural revival and even if the government had a hand in the cultural regeneration, its role was minor at best. They simply ascribed the cultural revival to a cultural consciousness of "identification with the nation, particularly national spirit or national essence" (Guo, 2004: 17). Makeham (2008) also claimed that "the conviction that the unique culture associated with the nation constitutes the basis of national identity" is one of the most important themes in contemporary Chinese Confucian discourse (p. 9). The idea that "*ruxue*, *rujia* thought, and *rujia* culture (Confucianism)

constitute a form of cultural expression integral to Chinese identity was pervasive among the discourse about Confucianism in contemporary China” (p. 9).

This debate actually shows two contrasting views concerning the relations between State and society in contemporary China. The Instrumentalists, in fact, view the Chinese State and society as two antagonist dichotomies and the State as zealous in exercising control over society.<sup>2</sup> The State, in their view, manipulated traditional culture so as to retain its ideological control over society because their old Marxist ideology has lost its appeal. The Primordialists, however, rejected the view of the State’s dominance over society, though they also agreed to the importance of the State in the cultural resurgence. They tended to believe that it was the initiative of society that has given rise to the revival of traditional culture. In other words, the cultural resurgence was not imposed upon society by the State; rather, it was a mutually negotiated process between the State and society. And the relations between the two were not always as contradictory as the Instrumentalists assume.

This research, by examining different roles of different social groups in an important case, the Chinese government’s approval of traditional Chinese festivals as public holidays, arrives at the conclusion that while the intellectuals have played a leading role in the whole process, the ordinary citizens’ increasing identification with traditional festivals was the primary base for the policy change; while the Chinese government, contrary to what the Instrumentalists have claimed, was resistant to the change even though they showed interest and enthusiasm at first; and finally, it approved the proposal due to strong pressure from the public. The reason for the discrepancy, as has been analyzed by this article, is that the Chinese government is not a unified whole with a common interest. Rather, it is a diversified body with contrasting interests. With this conclusion, this study also disapproves of the Instrumentalists’ assumption about the dominance of the Chinese State over society.

The following parts will, first of all, specify the rationale for choosing this case and introduce its background, and then move on to examine the different roles of the State and social groups in the case, and finally conclude with a brief summary.

## **2. Case Study of the Chinese Government’s Approval of Four Traditional Festivals as Public Holidays**

### ***2.1. The Rationale for Choosing the Case***

Since February 2004 when Professor Ji Baocheng, the president of People’s University of China, raised the proposal for setting the Tomb-Sweeping Day,

Dragon-Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Day and Chinese New Year's Eve as national public holidays, it has taken about four years for the proposal to be finally approved by the Chinese government. Along the four-year journey, the two social groups: the ordinary citizens and the intellectuals made their respective contributions to the final approval of the proposal. Specifically speaking, the growing cultural identity among ordinary citizens served as the fundamental motivation for the policy change while the intellectuals played a leading role in lobbying the government. Nevertheless, the Chinese government's attitude towards the issue was ambivalent as they showed interest and enthusiasm at first but became resistant to change later. The reasons for their shifting attitudes, as the case suggests, were mainly out of economic concern.

The reason for choosing the case is based on the consideration that traditional festivals are living embodiments of Chinese traditional culture, especially Confucianism. For instance, traditional Chinese festivals convey various Confucian norms concerning family and social relations (Gao, 2005). The Tomb-Sweeping Day, for example, is an occasion for Chinese people to pay homage to their past family members; while the Mid-Autumn Day and the New Year are important chances for people to strengthen their family ties (Siew, 2005). Besides, Confucian ethics concerning "proper social interactions" such as *Li* 礼 (appropriate manners) are practiced during the celebration of these festivals (Miller, 2006).

Moreover, the legends and historical stories involved in the festivals are themselves part of traditional culture. For example, legend has it that the Tomb-Sweeping Festival was established by a Chinese emperor in memory of a loyal official who sacrificed himself to save the monarch's life more than 2,500 years ago. The Dragon Boat Festival has been celebrated for thousands of years to commemorate Qu Yuan, a great patriotic poet who lived in the state of *Chu* 楚 during the Warring States period (475 B.C. to 221 B.C.). He drowned himself in the *Miluo* 汨罗 River in today's Hunan Province in 278 B.C., on the fifth day of the fifth month of the Chinese lunar calendar, hoping his death would alert the king to revitalize the kingdom (Yang, 1961). All these stories contain strong Confucian values for social relationships. Further, in these two legends, the Confucian norms concerning the superior (or head) and subordinate are clearly emphasized, that is, the superior should take care of the subordinate and the subordinate should respect the superior.

Thus, legalizing traditional festivals as public holidays is, in fact, a crucial measure to re-establish traditional culture as it offers free time for people to practice various customs and traditions, hence reinforcing traditional culture among the Chinese public. So it is fair to say that this is an institutionalized establishment for reviving traditional culture.

## 2.2. The Background of the Case

### 2.2.1. The history of the Chinese traditional festivals

Traditional Chinese festivals have more than 2000 years of history and some of them can be dated back even to the Zhou Dynasty (1027-221 B.C.) (Zhong, 1998). These traditional festivals were set by two traditional Chinese calendars: lunar and solar calendar, and there were over two dozens of them, among which, the Tomb-Sweeping Day, Dragon-Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Day and Chinese New Year were most influential. In ancient times, all these festivals, especially the important ones, were celebrated through various activities (Siew, 2005). Many of these traditions had been kept intact until China entered its modern stage (Gao, 2009).

After the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, China was ushered into a new era of nation-state building which covers two consecutive regimes, the “ROC” (the Republic of China) from 1911 to 1949 and the “PRC” (the People’s Republic of China) from 1949 until now. During this period of time, particularly from 1911 to 1979, traditional Chinese festivals and their accompanied traditions were heavily devastated by the two regimes in the name of “building a modernized China which could be fully integrated into the world” (Gao, 2005). Both of the two governments had taken drastic measures to bury old traditional festivals and set up new national holidays in accordance with their ideological need. Initially, the ROC government abolished dozens of old festivals and only kept the four major ones: Tomb-Sweeping Day, Dragon-Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Day and the Chinese New Year as national holidays. Later after 1949 when the PRC was established, the then incumbent government abolished the remaining holidays except the Chinese New Year. During the “Cultural Revolution” period (1966-1976), even the Chinese New Year holiday was officially called off by the State Council as it was convicted as “superstitious”, “damaging” and “lavishing” (Gao, 2005).

In 1979, the PRC government resumed the Chinese New Year holiday. From then on, as the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gradually relinquished its rigid control over ideology, traditional festivals gradually found its way back to the common Chinese people. Part of the traditional activities and practices accompanied with these festivals were also restored. For example, more and more people made use of the Tomb-Sweeping day to express their missing for their past family members. The Dragon-Boat competition was restarted in many places. Mooncake and family reunion in Mid-Autumn has been in vogue among common Chinese people again (Gargan, 2001).

### 2.2.2. *The “Golden Week” institution since 1999*

Another important background of the case is the “Golden Week” institution introduced by the Chinese government to boost domestic consumption since 1999. Before that time, the Chinese people had altogether 10 days for public holidays, which are the three-day May Day Holiday, National Day Holiday, Spring Festival breaks, and one-day New Year’s Day. In the new “Golden Week Holiday” institution, the weekends on one side of the first three holidays were designated as two working days, and people enjoy two days off on the working days, making the holidays seven consecutive days. Millions of Chinese travelled during the holidays, thus earning them the moniker of “Golden Week”.

The new holiday institution was very successful in terms of boosting domestic economy as it was reported that tourism revenue had increased from 14.1 billion yuan (1.76 billion US dollars) during the 1999 National Day holiday to 64.2 billion yuan during the Golden Week in October 2007 (*China Daily*, 2007). Statistics revealed that in 2001 alone, tourist numbers reached 780 million, much higher than the 1999 figure of 240 million (*China Daily*, 2007). However, after several years of experience and complaints about overcrowding, poor service, a scarcity of hotel rooms and damage to scenic spots, especially historic sites, during the holiday, the “Golden Week” have aroused strong debate over the merits of the week-long holiday.

### 2.2.3. *The incursions of the Western festivals*

Another related background is the incursion of the Western festivals. Since the 1980s, Western festivals like Christmas and Valentines’ Day have become more and more popular among the Chinese public, particularly among the youth. A 2003 survey about the knowledge of Chinese and Western festivals among Chinese youth showed that a majority of the young knew more about Western festivals than Chinese festivals (Gao *et al.*, 2010). This has been an important rationale for the intellectuals’ appeal for protecting traditional festivals.

It is against this complicated background that some intellectuals put forward a proposal to shorten the National Day and May Day holidays from three days to one day and spare the days to celebrate four traditional festivals: the Dragon Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Day, Tomb-Sweeping Day and New Year’s Eve.

## 2.3. *Different Roles of State and Social Groups in the Legalization Process*

From February 2004 when Ji Baocheng, the president of People’s University of China, raised his proposal about setting the Tomb-Sweeping Day,

Dragon-Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Day and Chinese New Year's Eve as public holidays in the "Policy Forum for the Social Development of China" (*zhongguo shehui fazhan zhengce gaoceng luntan* 中国社会发展政策高层论坛), it took about four years for the Chinese government to finally approve the proposal in December 2007. During the four-year process, the intellectuals, the ordinary citizens and the Chinese government all have played different roles in the policy change. Specifically speaking, the intellectuals were the primary and pioneering force during the course. They have instrumentally framed and promoted public support in their lobbying. The ordinary citizens served as a basic motivational force by strongly supporting the policy change. The Chinese government, contrary to what the Instrumentalists have claimed, was resistant to the change though they showed interest and enthusiasm at first. Finally, it approved the proposal due to strong pressure from the public.

Before coming to the details of the case, it is necessary to define the three concerned social groups: the Chinese government, the intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens. They are defined as follows:

- "The Chinese government" here mainly includes the top leaders of the Party-State, the cultural and economic sector of the central government and the provincial Chinese government as they also have authority and influence in the policy-making process.
- "The intellectuals" refer to the scholars, whether independent or affiliated with tertiary education institutes or professional research organizations. The journalists and professional commentators for newspapers and magazines are also included in this group.
- "The ordinary citizens" is different from the "masses"; it has two targeted groups: (1) "public opinion" as a whole, which can be identified in the readers' section in the non-party-affiliated newspapers, the polling made by the mass media or professional companies, and even the commercial publications of popular writers. (2) The virtual community members who are Internet users including websites or chat-room hosts, online article posters and browsers. There are quite a few pubs or chat-room specially created for discussing issues concerning traditional festivals.

### 2.3.1. *The intellectuals*

The intellectuals played a leading role in lobbying the government for approving the proposal. These intellectuals, many of whom are affiliated with universities and research organizations in Beijing, made their contributions through two major channels: (1) making formal policy proposals in China's Legal and Consultative government bodies like the National People's Congress

(hereafter NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (hereafter CPPCC) and (2) lobbying the administrative organizations such as the State Council by submitting related research reports.

Some of the intellectuals like Professor Ji are themselves the representatives of NPC. In 2004, he and other thirty some representatives, most of whom were intellectuals, jointly submitted a formal policy proposal concerning the traditional festivals to the Congress (*CCTV.com*, 2004). From that year on, these intellectuals continued to submit the proposal again and again until it was finally approved by the State Council at the end of 2007. Other leading intellectuals like Professor Cai Jiming from Tsinghua University, He Xingliang from the Chinese Academy of Social Science, who were also members of CPPCC, submitted similar proposals to CPPCC in 2006 and 2007 (*CCTV.com*, 2007). This really gave a strong push for the government in seriously treating the proposals.

In addition, some of the intellectuals also submitted their research reports to the administrative branch of the Chinese government. For example, the China Folklore Society (hereafter CFS), a non-governmental academic organization, has produced two policy reports to the Central Propaganda Department in 2004 and to the Ministry of Culture in 2007 respectively (Liu, 2006). Besides, some influential academicians like Liu Kuili, honorary president of the CFS, expressed his strong wishes to turn traditional festivals into public holidays when the officials from the Central Spiritual Civilization Office (one of the central government's organizations which are in charge of the ideological matters) consulted him on the issue.

Last but not least, those intellectuals also tried to influence public opinion through various mass media. For instance, in February 2005, the China Folklore Society organized an international conference entitled "Calendar of Nation-States – The International Symposium on Traditional Festivals and Legal National Holidays". They invited prominent experts including those from UCLA, Russian Social Science Academy and some Japanese universities. Further, they also invited important and influential media like China Central Television (CCTV) to cover their meetings and some of the lectures. In this way, these intellectuals created conducive media and public opinions for the approval of the policy proposals.

### 2.3.2. *The ordinary citizens*

The revival of cultural identity among the ordinary citizens, which was out of their disillusion with the official Marxism ideology, serves as the motivational force for the policy change. As has been mentioned previously, the ordinary citizens had gradually resumed their celebration of the traditional festivals long before 2004 when the policy proposal was made. For example,



Gao Binzhong, a professor from Beijing University, has observed that the traditional festivals have gradually recovered its appeal among the general public especially in the past twenty years (2005). For example, before 2004, it was quite common that some of the enterprises and non-governmental organizations had already given their staff early leave during traditional festivals especially on Mid-Autumn Day due to the increasing demand from the public for family reunion on these days. In fact, it is the growing sense of celebrating traditional festivals among the ordinary citizens that gave rise to the intellectuals' request for the policy change.

Throughout the policy-making process, strong public opinions for supporting legal traditional holidays played a crucial role especially in the final stage of government decision. After Professor Ji's proposal was made public, there was an enormous amount of online discussions about it. A search on the *Baidu.com* website (one of the biggest Internet searching websites in China) shows that, there were over 690,000 posts about the topic of "increasing traditional holidays" (*zengjia chuantong jiaqi* 增加传统假期) in the year of 2004 alone and most of them expressed their support for the change. A survey of 100 randomly selected sample posts from the *Baidu.com* website shows over 90 per cent of them claiming strong support for turning traditional festivals to public holidays. Though those Internet posts may not be representative of all common citizens' opinions, since a considerable number of the Internet users are youths with relatively modest education, such as high school students<sup>3</sup>, these posts at least reveal the strong voice from a certain section of citizens.

And at the final stage of decision, the governing body, the National Development and Reform Commission (*guojia fazhan yu gaige weiyuanhui* 国家发展与改革委员会, hereafter NDRC) conducted massive online and telephone surveys among the ordinary citizens from December 5th to 8th in 2007 to gather public opinion. Their survey in *Sina.com*<sup>4</sup>, one of the most popular portal sites in China, has collected 105,688 effective responses and 63.31 per cent of the respondents agreed that "it is necessary to increase holidays for traditional festivals and shorten the length of the May Golden Week. Only 26.84 per cent of them thought that there was no need to change and 9.85 per cent did not care. Among the five candidate traditional festivals, Tomb-Sweeping Day, Dragon-Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Day, Double Ninth Festival and Lanterns' Festival, 95.73 per cent of the respondents voted for Mid-Autumn Day as legal holiday, 58.31 per cent for Tomb-Sweeping Day, 45.62 per cent for Lanterns Festival, 43.57 per cent for Dragon-Boat Festival and 12.30 per cent for Double Ninth Festival (*Sina.com*, 2007).

Besides, telephone surveys were also made by the People's University of China among citizens in six different cities, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Changchun and Xi'an. There were 2,634 respondents participating

in the survey and the results showed that 65.6 per cent of them supported increasing public holidays for traditional festivals and shortening holidays for the “May Day Golden Week” and “National Day Golden Week”. 23.6 per cent of them disagreed with the changes and 10.7 per cent did not care (Xinhua News Agency, 2007).

It is important to note that the citizens, in fact, were choosing from two alternatives: getting more days for celebrating traditional festivals but less “Golden Week” or getting no time for celebrating traditional festivals but enjoying more “Golden Weeks”. They did not choose to get more or less holidays but how to distribute the 10 or 11 legal holidays. This tested their loyalty to and preference for the traditional festivals. As we can see from the survey results, a majority of the respondents chose to distribute more time for celebrating traditional festivals, which was a sign of increasing cultural identity among the common Chinese people. It was this strengthened cultural identity that gave the final push for the government’s decisions.

### *2.3.3. The Chinese government*

The Chinese government’s attitude towards the issue was ambivalent. On the one hand, some of the government units showed their willingness to change by consulting from some leading intellectuals; however, on the other hand, they were also worried about the loss of economic interests created by the Golden Week effect during the previous years. In fact, complaints from some business interest groups handicapped and delayed the government’s decision on that matter. That’s why it has taken almost four years for the government to make the final decision.

In February 2004 when the proposal for the change of holidays was first raised in the “Policy Forum for the Social Development of China”, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was apparently interested at this proposal as they sent relevant officials to discuss the issue with Professor Ji and other intellectuals. Liu Kuili, the head of the China Folklore Society (hereafter CFS), said that “in spring 2004, he and other five experts had been invited by the Central Spiritual Civilization Office (one of the central government’s organizations in charge of the ideological matters) to discuss the possible policy changes (Liu, 2010).

However, until 2006, the NDRC did not make any meaningful decisions except issuing a report formally proposing cancelling the May Day and National Day Golden Week. In 2006, the NDRC assigned a research panel for the issue who made their conclusions that it was necessary to increase traditional holidays. The NDRC, however, still did not make any substantial decision until December 2007.

Why did the government take such a long time for the policy change? The biggest obstacle came from some interest groups like the tourism companies which had made a big profit from the 7 days Golden Week. Statistics reveal that tourism revenue had increased from 14.1 billion RMB (1.76 billion US dollars) during the 1999 National Day holiday to 64.2 billion RMB during the Golden Week in October 2007 (*China Daily*, 2007). Moreover, during the Golden Week, people were also prone to make big purchases. So, the shopping malls, commercial centres and even the manufacturers also got benefited. Interest groups in these industries were worried that the holiday change would lead to their financial loss as one Golden Week will be abolished due to the increase of traditional holidays.

Even after the policy-change has been implemented in 2008, there were still strong voices demanding recovering the May Golden Week and abolishing the newly set Tomb-Sweeping and Dragon-Boat Public holidays. The Guangdong provincial government has even made public announcement that they planned to recover the May Golden Week in 2009 and their justification was “stimulating the economy” (*Information Daily*, 2009). Many other governments including Chongqing municipal government were about to follow suit. The Guangdong government claimed that the May Golden Week was a strong pusher for the economy especially in lifting consumption and tourism. An influential Internet post calling for recovering May Holiday explained that the increase of traditional holidays was “futile” for national economy as the increased traditional holidays scattered around the whole year and could not offer enough time for the public especially the migrant workers to get back to their hometowns (*Information Daily*, 2009).

Though such proposals were denied by the central government later, we can see that there were apparently different views concerning the issue even within the Chinese government itself. The central and some local governments had almost opposite views on this issue. Even within the central government, different functional agencies such as those responsible for cultural affairs and those in charge of economic affairs, also had contrasting opinions on this issue. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the Chinese government was the main pusher for the policy change; on the contrary, it was the government that has been pushed to approve the traditional festivals as public holidays.

### 3. Summary and Conclusions

Through the previous analysis, the case study has yielded the following findings: (1) the struggle for the approval of the four traditional festivals as national legal holidays is an ideological movement aiming at reviving traditional Chinese culture and combating against the foreign cultural “incursion”. (2) Throughout the movement, the ordinary citizens served as the

fundamental driving force, with the intellectuals leading the way. (3) As for the government, it was entangled in the dilemma for choosing economic gains or ideological support and finally it chose to comply with the public request so as to gain legitimacy for its rule.

These findings confirm the Promordialist view concerning the fundamental role of ordinary citizens and intellectuals in the cultural revival. They also challenge the Instrumentalist position concerning the decisive role of the Chinese government, as the government was far less enthusiastic and active in approving the traditional festivals as public holidays as the Instrumentalist theories presuppose. And the reason, as analyzed previously, was that the Chinese government is not a unified whole with a common interest. Rather, it is a diversified body with contrasting interests. Though the cultural sector of the government endorsed the policy shift to boost cultural revival, the economic sector strongly opposed it. And the local government, out of their self-interest, also stood against the policy change. Hence, it is too simplistic to view the government as one organization with a single voice. In fact, the truth is that the government is never, unanimously or always, supportive of any particular social course such as the revival of traditional culture; some parts may champion the course for certain purposes, but others simply oppose it. Thus, in a word, it is not fully justified to conceive the government as the decisive power in the resurgence of traditional culture in contemporary China and the Instrumentalists' view of the Chinese State's dominance over society should also be questioned.

## Notes

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1. The author would like to extend her thanks to the two anonymous reviewers for their comments and also Professor William Case in the Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong.
  2. Such view has been influential among some important works, for example, Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, "Reform, Conflict and Resistance in Contemporary China", *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance*, Routledge, 2010; Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz and Mark Selden, *Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2005; Ching Kwan Lee, *Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007; Kevin J. O'Brien (ed.), *Popular Protest in China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008.

3. The author would like to thank the suggestions of one anonymous reviewer concerning the Internet posts and Internet voting.
4. For detailed questionnaires in the website, please refer to <http://survey.news.sina.com.cn/survey.php?id=31233&dpc=1>, assessed on 23rd August 2010. The survey was also conducted by telephone with randomly selected Chinese families.

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